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THE COOPERATIVE FIRM AS MONITORED CREDIT
BRENT HUETH AND PHILIPPE MARCOUL
Abstract. We develop a nancial-contracting theory of the cooperative rm where pro-
duction requires three generic tasks: working, managing, and monitoring. Workers provide
an intermediate input (or labor directly); managers convert the workers' input into a nal
output; and directors monitor managers. We model the cooperative rm by letting the
workers act also as directors. We show how bundling the labor and monitoring tasks can
expand the scope for equilibrium market activity, even when doing so results in a strictly
positive deadweight loss. Our theory provides new insight with respect to a substantial
theoretical and empirical literature on the life cycle of worker-managed rms, and with
respect to a complementary body of anecdotal evidence on the causes of worker buyouts
and cooperative degeneration. Our theory is also consistent with dierences between
the board compensation policies of cooperative rms, where members typically receive
little more than travel and per-diem reimbursements, and of investor-owned rms, where
members receive substantial pay often based in part on rm nancial performance.
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Introduction
Considerable research eort has been directed at understanding the relative merits of
cooperative versus investor ownership.1 Disagreement remains, however, regarding the core
set of motivations giving rise to the dominance of investor ownership in modern economies
(Dow and Putterman, 2000).2 There is arguably a better understanding of the relative
disadvantages of cooperative ownership than of its advantages. This is not surprising given
that cooperative capital is supplied primarily by members, who by denition cannot be solely
investors, and who in most cases must be geographically proximate to the rm in order to
transact either as input suppliers, workers, or consumers. This feature sharply restricts the
pool of potential sources of capital available to cooperative rms, and represents a clear
source of disadvantage relative to rms with no restrictions on outside investment. Also,
preference heterogeneity among cooperative members, and a lack of liquidity in membership
markets, together generate internal decision making frictions that are less severe in a publicly
traded rm (Dow, 2001; Hansmann, 1996; Holmström, 1999).
Despite these disadvantages, cooperative rms seem often to be viable in economic en-
vironments that cannot support activity nanced purely by outsiders. Hetherington (1991,
pg. 247) sums up his cross-sectoral investigation of cooperative activity by concluding that,
Proprietary rms tend to be more aggressive, innovative, and exible competitors, while
mutuals, particularly cooperatives, continue to serve markets at rates of return at which pro-
prietary rms would withdraw from business. This observation suggests that cooperative
rms can extend the range of feasible market activity into relatively low-return environ-
ments, and in this sense apparently have an operational advantage over other organizational
forms. Dierences in work incentives provide one natural place to look for the source of
this advantage. For example, as Dow and Putterman (2000, pp. 324-325) point out in the
context of the worker cooperative, mutual monitoring, reductions in supervisory expenses,
1For the purpose of this paper, the labels investor and cooperative are used to dierentiate rms that are
owned by outside investors, versus those that are owned by some other class of members. These members,
in addition to providing the rm's capital, transact with the rm either as input suppliers, workers, or
consumers. The distinction is not without ambiguity. As Hansmann (1996, pp. 13-15) points out, an
investor-owned rm is nothing more than a capital cooperative where members transact with the rm by
providing capital in return for a share of rm prots. Conversely, cooperative members are clearly investors:
they fund the rm's activities by foregoing prot allocations (patronage refunds), by allowing the rm to
tax member transactions (per-unit retains), and also by investing cash directly in the rm (Frederick, 2005,
pp. 69-81). The distinction is important for this paper only insofar as there is a dierence in the nature of
the business relationship a rm has with its members. Pure investors provide cash in return for a share of
prots; cooperative members do the same, but also transact with the rm for goods and services.
2The relevant literature is vast, and we do not attempt a comprehensive review here. The interested reader
can consult Bonin et al. (1993) and Dow (2003) for surveys regarding the labor-managed rm. Parallel
developments in the literature on agricultural cooperatives (which, early on, preceded many of the develop-
ments in the labor-managed-rm literature) are nicely discussed in Sexton (1984). Consumer cooperatives
have also been the subject of considerable theoretical and empirical research. See, for example, Enke (1945)
, Sexton and Sexton (1987), and Hart and Moore (1998) for general theoretical contributions, and Banerjee
et al. (2004) and Smith (1984) for relatively recent applications specic to the credit sector.
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and strong work incentives, are widely accepted stylized characteristics of worker-owned
rms. Certainly, if a cooperative rm can provide incentives to its workers that cannot
be replicated in an investor-owned rm, then the cooperative rm can be sustainable in
otherwise unsustainable environments.
The critical question is of course why cooperatively-owned rms can provide these incen-
tives, while investor-owned rms cannot? What prevents an investor-owned rm from using
exactly the same contract with its members that a cooperative rm uses? In attempting to
answer this question, we focus on the dual role of members as input suppliers or workers on
the one hand, and as monitors of management in their role as directors on the other.3 The
monitoring task is a direct byproduct of member nancing and control, which we take as
the dening feature of a cooperative rm. Motivational costs or agency rents vary across
cooperative and investor-owned rms in this context because members are naturally moti-
vated monitors. Heuristically, the value to members of transacting with the rm as workers
or input suppliers increases with rm performance (because then the rm can aord to pay
higher wages) so members have a built-in incentive to monitor management.
Although agency rents may be lower in a cooperative rm, there are countervailing costs
associated with nancing and directorship by workers. In addition to the liquidity and
preference-heterogeneity costs noted above, workers and input suppliers are often poorly
trained to take on directorship responsibilities. We model these varied costs of member
control in reduced form by supposing simply that monitoring by cooperative members is more
costly than monitoring by specialists. This assumption eectively introduces a deadweight
cost for the cooperative rm, relative to a rm operated by outside investors. Combining
the incentive benet and deadweight cost aspects of member ownership results in a hard
times theory of the cooperative rm: incentive benets expand the set of feasible nancial
contracts, but only by shrinking total economic surplus relative to investor ownership. As
a result, this expansion is only desirable when a rm nanced by outsiders is not feasible.
Such an infeasibility occurs when there is insucient total surplus generated by the rm
to motivate all the relevant parties. We show how a cooperative rm can operate in such
an environment, so long as the deadweight cost associated with cooperation is suciently
3Our focus in this paper is therefore on the producer cooperative. Dow and Putterman (2000, pg. 321)
make a distinction among labor-managed rms and rms controlled by input suppliers (e.g., agricultural
cooperatives), by customers (consumer cooperatives), or by others (for instance, non-prot organizations)."
Bonin et al. (1993, pg. 1291) similarly focus on producer cooperatives, but dene this focus in such a way
as to rule out study of consumer and marketing cooperatives, collective farms, partnerships and other forms
of not-for-prot organizations. While we agree that consumer cooperatives, partnerships, and non-prot
organizations are fundamentally dierent from labor-managed rms, making a strong distinction relative to
rms controlled by input suppliers (i.e., marketing cooperatives) seems articial. Any input that is supplied
to such a rm is a transformation of labor eort, and the relevant set of incentive and organizational design
issues dier only by degree (e.g., in relation to the separability of each individual workers' contribution
to total output, and possibly with respect to the nancial resources of workers). Moreover, as we will
later argue, worker and marketing cooperatives (or what for us are producers cooperatives) exhibit similar
empirical patterns in terms of a life cycle.
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small. An analogous logic is used in the corporate nance literature to explain the role of
banks, venture capitalist, and private equity funds as sources of monitored, and relatively
high-cost, funds (Tirole, 2006, chapters 8 and 9).
In what follows, we briey summarize related work within the empirical and theoretical
literatures on cooperative behavior. We then present our model of the cooperative rm and
demonstrate how bundling the working and monitoring tasks can extend market viability.
The subsequent section considers a number of extensions to the basic model, and the nal
section concludes with a summary and discussion of directions for future research.
Related Literature
Worker buyouts of nancially distressed investor-owned rms are a common source of
formation for labor-managed rms (Dow, 2003, pg. 213). Similarly, Hetherington (1991, pp.
182-186) notes that many existing agricultural marketing cooperatives formed in response
to exit by private handlers. Conversely, evidence suggests that cooperative rms are apt to
degenerate through a gradual substitution of non-member labor for member labor, or to
sell out (demutualize) to investors when the rm is performing well. Collectively, these
observations support the view that cooperatives have a characteristic life cycle involving
formation in low-return economic environments, but eventual demise when returns are high
(Ben-Ner, 1988). To understand these observations, two related sets of questions have to
be answered. First, why would workers ever choose to invest in a failing private enterprise?
And second, when successful, why is it dicult to sustain the cooperative organizational
structure?
In attempting to answer just the rst question, Ben-Ner and Jun (1996) argue that em-
ployee buyouts act as a screening mechanism with respect to the private information of rm
managers. Management will never accept a low price for the rm when future prospects are
good, but may be willing to pay relatively higher wages. Similarly, when future prospects
are poor, management will never pay high wages, but may be willing to accept a relatively
low sale price. In eect, workers can get a good deal in bad return states that result in
part from their ability to bargain simultaneously over wages and a possible buyout. This
argument has considerable intuitive appeal, but ignores changes in the nancial and orga-
nizational makeup of the rm pre- and post-buyout. That is, while it may be true that a
buyout oer by workers provides a means of eliciting information from rm managers, it
remains to be explained why employees (or input suppliers) should control the rm post
buyout? Why not nance the purchase with the assistance of external investors, perhaps
using the rm's assets as collateral, and grant control to investors? There is nothing about
the way workers organize their activities in this story that speaks to the special structural
characteristics of the cooperative rm.
In an agricultural context, Hansmann (1996, p. 124) argues that farmers may choose to
invest equity in a marginally valuable processing facility if the alternative is one or a small
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number of oligopsony buyers. That is, the return on investment in such a facility is made up
of rm-level prots plus any benet associated with inducing competitive pricing by other
buyers. However, in many of the examples cited by Hetherington (1991) where farmers have
taken over the activities of an investor-owned rm, it has been the threat of no buyer that
has motivated farmers, rather than the threat of a small number of oligopsony buyers .
Nevertheless, a considerable body of literature suggests that cooperatives indeed have
played an important pro-competitive role in agricultural markets (e.g., Refsell, 1914; Sexton,
1990; Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). However, cooperatives also seem to extend markets into
economic environments that cannot support the activity of a rm funded by outsiders.
These two eects are qualitatively distinct. The results we present below are the rst we are
aware of that provide a formal rationale for the market extending feature of cooperative
activity. This eect has been discussed at length in the descriptive literature on cooperation
in reference to the role that cooperatives play in meeting unmet services (e.g., Fulton and
Ketilson, 1992). Cooperative lending institutions have similarly been cited as a means of
providing credit to populations that are excluded from private credit markets (Guinnane,
2001).
Miyazaki (1984) develops a model to explain the full cooperative life cycle, and in doing so
addresses both the hard-times formation and degeneration questions. Briey, cooperative
and noncooperative rms are distinguished in his model by the types of contracts that
each rm can write with its employees. A cooperative rm can oer long-term contracts
with income-smoothing benets, while a noncooperative rm pays a competitive spot wage
contingent on the realization of uncertainty. The cooperative contract extends the range of
feasible economic activity by providing insurance to its members that is not available on the
outside. However, cooperative members receive remuneration that depends on rm prots
so that in high-return states, cooperative members are expensive relative to wage labor.
This eect generates an incentive to substitute wage labor for member labor in high return
states, and in the limit to degeneration with a single cooperative member. The model by
Ben-Ner (1984) is similar in spirit, but where the the cooperative rm is dened behaviorally
as an organization that maximizes prot per worker, and where cooperative members are
assumed to have higher labor productivity than labor hired from the outside.
More recently, Rey and Tirole (2006) explicitly model membership dynamics. Following
Hansmann's thesis regarding governance costs in democratic rms, the authors focus on
members' inter-generational frictions related to capital investment. They derive conditions
under which cooperatives can credibly compete with investor-owned corporations, showing
that cooperatives with a membership access fee (i.e. discriminatory cooperatives) are usu-
ally better equipped to face such competition. Interestingly for our purpose, they conclude
that the non discriminatory cooperative is a highly fragile institution that is vulnerable
to attacks by discriminatory cooperatives or by for-prots. Our theory reconciles this con-
clusion with the stubborn fact of existence for such cooperatives: These more traditional
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cooperatives exist possibly because their natural economic habitat is not attractive to the
more common investor-owned rm.
Partnershipsa particular kind of worker-controlled rmare prominent in high-return
service professions (e.g., law, medicine, nancial services). Two recent studies point toward
the importance of human capital acquisition for workers, and the relative unobservabil-
ity of product quality, as key factors in explaining the prominence of partnerships in such
settings. Levin and Tadelis (2005) show how the partnership structure results in an equi-
librium hiring policy that selects relatively high-quality workers. As a result, organizing
as a partnership signals high quality to the market, and this provides an advantage in set-
tings where consumers experience quality on after purchase. Morrison and Wilhelm (2004)
focus on investment banking rms and on intergenerational incentives for the transfer of
tacit knowledge from senior to junior workers.4 The lack of liquidity of partnership equity,
and the relative importance of reputation in determining rm value, provide the means for
establishing ecient mentoring incentives.
Although the existence of partnerships in relatively high-return service sectors is con-
sistent with the model we present below, this kind of worker-controlled rm admittedly is
not the focus of our analysis. Many of the organizational handicaps normally associated
with the cooperative structure are noticeably absent in settings where partnerships tend
to operate. Capital requirements are relatively low, members' interests are fairly homoge-
neous,5 and members are well educated and capable directors. Our model, which trades o
a reduced-form deadweight cost of cooperative governance against an incentive complemen-
tarity between working and directing, yields a trivial prediction of partnership dominance
when the cost of worker monitoring is suciently low relative to the cost of monitoring by
a third party. Moreover, there is arguably less opportunity for signicant managerial abuse
in service partnerships. In such organizations, the role of management, except in very large
partnerships, is limited mostly to back-oce and human-resource management tasks.
A cooperative rm is dened in U.S. tax law as an organization operating on a coop-
erative basis and allocating amounts to patrons on the basis of the business done with said
patrons (Frederick, 2005, pg. 41). The expression operating on a cooperative basis is not
dened anywhere in federal tax code, but is loosely described in various state incorporation
statutes as an organization that is nanced and democratically controlled by members (i.e.,
4To explain the recent conversion of many of these partnerships into public companies, Morrison and Wilhelm
(2008) further argue that technological progress has allowed for the codication of this tacit knowledge and,
as a result, partnerships have lost their organizational superiority over public companies for the purpose of
investment banking. We relate organizational choice to market conditions. Because market conditions are
by their nature uctuating, a distinctive feature of our model is the potential for conversion and reversion
in response to changing market circumstances.
5This is a key dierence between partnerships and worker cooperatives. A typical worker cooperative has a
fully inclusive ownership policy where every employeenot just professional staare granted an ownership
stake. Such a policy is likely to increase board level heterogeneity and internal frictions with respect to rm-
level decisions.
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workers or consumers), where earnings are allocated according to use rather than nancial
stake, and where returns on outside investment are limited (Baarda, 1986, pg. 4). Perhaps
it is reasonable to model these attributes in reduced form by assuming that employment
contracts, or rm objectives, dier across cooperative and noncooperative rms. However,
neither approach addresses the core organizational distinction regarding the bundling of -
nancing, control, anduse. Jensen and Meckling (1979) make this point forcefully in their
critique of the labor-managed rm literature, arguing that What renders most of these ef-
forts [to model and compare the labor-managed rm with a for-prot rm] unproductive is
the almost universal tendency in the modeling to ignore precisely those institutional factors
which are most crucial for the comparison.
In this paper, we focus on the dual role of workers as laborers and monitors of man-
agement as one clearly identiable institutional factor that distinguishes cooperative from
noncooperative rms.6 The monitoring role that is assumed by the board of directors in
a public stock corporation is performed by workers (or their elected representatives) in a
producer or worker cooperative. Presumably, it is ecient to take on this role in part be-
cause as members they nance the rm. Whatever the reason (we consider situations where
investment and control are decoupled, and where they go together for reasons exogenous to
our model), worker monitoring has an advantage relative to monitoring by outsiders. Given
an employment contract that is tied in some way to rm value, worker monitors have an
incentive to monitor management without direct compensation for doing so. That such an
eect exists seems plausible based on empirical observations regarding dierential pay for
outside and worker directors. Although there are no systematic studies of this dierential,
Reynolds (2004) documents retainers for a sample of U.S. agricultural supply and marketing
cooperatives that range between 100 and 200 dollarsand no performance-based pay. In
sharp contrast, directors at noncooperative rms are payed substantial salaries plus often
some form of performance-based reward. In addition to pay dierences, ample case-study
and descriptive evidence suggests that workers (and agricultural producers) are thoroughly
engaged in managerial monitoring within their rmsmuch more so than the directors of
a typical public-stock corporation. Greenberg (1986, p. 51) writes, Any shareholder is free
to go to the general manager or the treasurer in the business oce and ask to see what-
ever documents or data he desires, a right that is often practiced. He further notes that
the average attendance rate at general meetings (held at least twice a year) exceeded 90
percent. The theory that follows accounts for the cooperative life cycle, and is consistent
with these observed dierences in pay structure and monitoring intensity for cooperative
and noncooperative directors.
6The formal restriction on returns payed to outside equity represents another fundamental distinction. The
cost of such a restriction is clear, but what is the benet? One possibility is that restricting returns payed to
outsiders in the future may encourage further investment by insiders in the present. In this view, cooperative
statutes might be viewed as a socially benecial commitment device that increases member participation.
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At a purely formal level, our results relate to recent work on multitasking and scope
economies in the provision of incentives. Our treatment of the cooperative rm focuses on the
bundling of two tasks in the job assignment of a single individual that in an investor-owned
rm are unbundled, or specialized, across two or more individuals. Workers or input suppliers
in a cooperative rm literally have two jobs: they provide labor or material inputs and
they supervise management. What kinds of technological or market environments support
bundling of this kind? Itoh (1994) was among the rst authors to consider this question. In
an extension of the multitasking model developed by Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Itoh
(1994) shows how it can be ecient to combine tasks to save on risk bearing costs. Laux
(2001) shows how, in a limited-liability contracting environment, total wage costs can be
reduced by assigning multiple independent projects to a single agent, rather than to multiple
agents. By paying the agent only when all projects succeed, the principal can eectively relax
the agent's limited liability constraint by punishing the agent for a given project by taking
away payment on another. Similarly, Sinclair-Desgagné (1999) shows how a principal can
implement higher-powered incentive schemes in a multi-task setting by relying on sequential
audits of the agent's performance. More recently, Schmitz (2005) demonstrates that two
sequential projects should be carried out by the same agent only when project surplus is
not high enough to justify always paying for high eort on the second project. Our work
diers from the Itoh (1994) in that we study a contracting environment where agents are
risk neutral, but have limited wealth. The results in Laux (2001) and Schmitz (2005) have
a similar avor to ours in that they both identify situations where there are incentive scope
economies in bundling tasks. Our framework diers formally in that we study contracting
over a single project, rather than multiple independent projects. More importantly, we
make the link between a key structural feature of a cooperative rm and the potential for
incentive economies.
Theory
The theory we develop extends the corporate nance model of Holmström and Tirole
(1997) who treat the rm as a project to be undertaken and nanced by a limited-wealth
entrepreneur, a lender, and, potentially, a third agent who monitors the entrepreneur. The
model is simple, but rich in predictions regarding the nature of contracting among the various
parties involved in nancing, organizing, and controlling the rm's operations.
Technology, Information, and Payos. A rm undertakes a project that can either
succeed or fail. When the rm's project succeeds, it generates revenue R, and otherwise
generates no revenue. Production requires two tasks that we label working and managing.
Each task is independently carried out by at most one individual. The project costs I dollars
to implement, but neither the worker nor the manager has any liquid wealth to pay this
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cost: the rm can only operate by borrowing.7 The opportunity cost of funds for passive
investors is normalized to zero, and all parties are assumed risk neutral. The worker and the
manager must each earn an expected return of at least zero to participate in the project.
We assume that eort levels applied to the working and managing tasks are each binary
and can be high or low. High eort improves the likelihood of project success. Absent
eort by at least one party, the project fails for sure. For simplicity, we assume that each
individual's marginal contribution to the probability of success is independent of the other's.
If worker eort is high, but manager eort is low, the project succeeds with probability
q > 0. Alternatively, if manager eort is high, but worker eort is low, the project succeeds
with probability r > 0. When eort is high on both tasks, the probability of success is
p ≡ q + r < 1. In an extension we consider a more general technology and show that doing
so changes little in our analysis.
The worker incurs a private noncontractible cost c > 0 when eort for the relevant task
is high. The manager's eort cost is measured by forgone private noncontractible benets
B > 0 that can be earned by not exerting eort, or shirking. We assume that eort must
be high on both tasks for the project to potentially generate positive expected surplus:
Assumption 1 (No Low Eort).
max {rR, qR− c+B} − I < 0.
This assumption rules out the feasibility of operating at a low level of eort on either task.
A monitor can be hired to limit the scope for managerial shirking. Doing so reduces B
by ∆B > 0 to b ≡ B − ∆B ≥ 0. Tirole (2006, p. 357) motivates this modeling approach
by suggesting that the manager be viewed as having some latitude for project choice after
all parties have contractually committed to participating in the rm. In particular, if the
manager can choose between two projects that are identical in every respect except that one
generates relatively large noncontractible private benets for the manager, then the moni-
tor's job is to distinguish these two projects, and to rule out the one with high managerial
benets. Knowing that this will occur in equilibrium, investors and the worker alter their
expectations accordingly with respect to the incentive payment needed to induce high eort
by the manager. Monitoring eectively represents a third production task within the rm.
Although the monitor's action does not directly aect the rm's probability of success, it
does potentially make implementing high management eort less costly. If the rm would
not be feasible without high managerial eort, then the monitor's eort is potentially an
essential production input.
We distinguish between private, or third-party, and worker monitoring. The rm can
hire a private monitor who incurs an unobservable cost mp to reduce the manager's benet
7Assuming that the agents can contribute some liquid assets to the project is a straightforward extension
of the model. The more interesting case in which illiquid assets can be pledged is tackled as an extension
below.
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from shirking. The private monitor must earn a net return of at least zero to partici-
pate. Alternatively, the worker can perform the same monitoring taskthat is, form a
cooperativeat unobservable cost mc > mp. The additional cost ∆m ≡ mc − mp that
the cooperative organization bears can represent dierences in training between workers
and specialized monitors, convexity in eort cost as workers now perform two tasks, or a
reduced form for other governance frictions associated with the cooperative form. Despite
the organizational deadweight cost ∆m, the cooperative structure has an advantage in the
sense that any success-contingent incentive provided for eort on the working task indirectly
provides an incentive to exert eort on the monitoring task.8
For expositional ease, we refer to a rm that does not use worker monitoring as a private
rm. We begin by characterizing the scope for economic activity by an unmonitored private
rm. We initially assume that even in the private rm, the worker is the residual claimant
on rm value, and further that the private monitor does not have any wealth to contribute
to the project. Although it is perhaps natural to bundle investment with residual claimancy
(suggesting we assign residual claimancy to passive investors), there is no reason in our model
to do so. Eectively, we initially assume perfect competition in the market for loanable funds,
and that the worker, rather than the manager or the monitor, sets contract terms within the
rm. We then show that private monitoring extends the range of feasible economic activity,
and further that the magnitude of this extension is not dependent on the assignment of
residual claimancy in the model.9 We develop an analogous treatment of the cooperative
rm and make a comparison across the two organizational structures. We will show that
monitoring by the worker, despite the extra cost ∆m, can expand the range of feasible
economic activity relative to a privately monitored rm.
8Relative to private monitoring, monitoring by the worker does not alter the rm's production technology
(represented by the parameters q and r). For example, if in addition to policing management, a monitor
also provides advice, one might hypothesize that a cooperative board is less well informed about the relevant
set of business opportunities for the rm, but better at policing the manager (e.g., because board members
have regular interaction with the manager as input suppliers or workers). These eects could be represented
in our model as a decrease in p and an increase in q. If p decreases, then under worker monitoring, the
rm succeeds less often when both parties exert high eort. However, an increase in q lowers the cost
of providing incentives to the manager, because the realization of project success or failure becomes more
informative about the manager's action (for the simple technology in this paper, these assumptions also
imply a reduction in r, so that providing incentives to the worker becomes more costly). We allow for these
eects in an extension.
9One is tempted to label the privately monitored rm, particularly when the monitor invests (which we allow
for in an extension), as an investor-owned rm. However, there are no dynamics in our model, and so no
sense in which control with respect to an uncertain future plays a role. Monitoring in our model eectively
proscribes specic and known current period actions that would otherwise be available to management.
In this sense, our model is missing an important element of what denes ownership (control rights over
unforseen contingencies). A more complete modeling of the cooperative rm would therefore include the
bundling of three things: working, monitoring, and control. However, formal modeling of interactions
between explicit performance incentives and indirect incentives arising from the assignment of control rights
is still an unsettled area of research. We leave this extension for future research.
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Private Firm. Absent monitoring, and contingent on project success, the worker receives
R and makes payments to the manager and to passive investors. Under Assumption 1, the
project is only feasible if both the worker and the manager are induced to exert high eort.
Conditional on high eort by the worker, and denoting the manager's success-contingent
payment by x, the manager is willing to exert high eort if her expected payment from
doing so, px, is at least as large as her payment from shirking, qx + B. Passive investors
are willing to contribute capital to launch the project so long as their expected payment,
conditional on high eort by the worker and manager, is at least as large as the project cost,
I. Because the worker is residual claimant on rm value, she will always choose to minimize
transfers to the manager and passive investors. The worker has no liquid wealth and cannot
pay out anything when the project fails. Consequently, the worker oers the manager and
passive investors contracts that pay out B/r and I/p in the case of project success, and zero
otherwise. Neither party is willing to enter such a contract unless they believe that there is
enough leftover surplus to motivate high eort by the worker. Under high work eort, the
worker earns p(R− I/p−B/r)− c, and under low work eort, r(R− I/p−B/r).
Comparing these expressions and rearranging, we have the following lemma
Lemma 1. (Feasibility Requirement with No Monitoring). An unmonitored rm is feasible
if and only if










The rm is feasible when market returns R are large enough to cover the opportunity cost
of funds, and at the same time provide sucient motivation to elicit high eort from the
worker and the manager. There is an ineciency in choosing to carry out the project
because the worker and the manager do not bear the full cost of failure once the
investment funds are sunk. Each party must instead be provided information rents
(expected surplus above their reservation values of zero), and this limits the scope for
attracting passive investors. In particular, projects where (I + c)/p < R < Ru generate
positive expected surplus, but are not nancially viable. This is a well-known form of
credit rationing that distorts the project implementation decision.
To see how monitoring can extend the range of project feasibility, suppose that the relevant
parties pay a private monitor a success-contingent amount y to monitor the manager. If
the monitor incurs the unobservable eort cost mp, she observes the relevant set of projects
available to the manager and can rule out the one with private benets B. Provided the
monitor can be provided adequate incentive to actually carry out this task, the worker can
therefore induce managerial eort with a contract that pays out b/r in the case of project
success and zero otherwise. Monitoring generates an expected wage saving of p∆B/r. The
worker, however, must ensure that the monitor's payment y is sucient to induce monitoring
eort. If the manager and the worker both exert high eort, expected surplus for the monitor
is py − mp. Absent monitoring eort, the manager will always choose to shirk and earn
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qb/r + B > pb/r. As a result, if the monitor chooses to shirk on her task, she earns qy.
From the worker's perspective as residual claimant on rm value, the minimum success
contingent payment needed to ensure incentive compatibility for the monitor is therefore
mp/r. Anticipating Corollary 1 below, the benet from monitoring reduces to a simple
comparison between ∆B and mp: monitoring is potentially useful only when its cost is
smaller than the wage savings it generates. Because the rm is only feasible when both the
manager and the worker have sucient incentive to exert high eort, and using an analogous
logic to that used above for Lemma 1, we have
Lemma 2. (Feasibility Requirement with Private Monitor) A privately monitored rm is
feasible if and only if










Monitoring reduces B to b, but at the cost of having to pay a monitor at least mp/r.
Direct comparison of the expressions in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 yields
Corollary 1. (Market Extension with Private Monitor) Private monitoring extends the
feasible range of market activity if and only if mp < ∆B.
This result is of course not new and is presented only to establish a baseline for point
of comparison.10 Information rents earned by the manager and the worker create a wedge
between the private and social calculus of choosing to undertake the project. This wedge
sometimes results in projects being turned down that would generate positive expected
surplus in a full information economy. Monitoring can attenuate this ineciency if doing so
is not too costly relative to the reduction in information rents that monitoring generates.
From the perspective of social welfare, however, monitoring should take place only when it's
necessarymonitoring is pure deadweight loss if the project is otherwise feasible.11
Before beginning analysis of the cooperative rm, we rst verify that the threshold Rm
does not depend on our assumption regarding worker residual claimancy. To see this, rst
consider residual claimancy by the monitor. The worker and manager must each be paid,
respectively, at least c/q and b/r to ensure high eort, conditional on the monitor also having
adequate incentive to exert high eort. The monitor's expected payo under high eort by
all parties is p(R − I/p − c/q − b/r) − mp, where again the passive investor is paid her
reservation value I/p. The monitor prefers high eort when this expected payo is at least
as large as q(R−I/p−c/q−b/r), which is what she could earn by oering the contracts I/p,
10For an excellent discussion and synthesis of the extensive corporate nance literature on monitoring and
nancial intermediation, see Tirole (2006, chapters 8 and 9).
11Nevertheless, for mp < ∆B, it is a cost that will always be born in a rm with worker residual claimancy.
In this case, monitoring eectively transfers agency rent from the manager to the worker at an expected cost,
pmp/r, that is always lower than the expected transfer, p∆B/r. In an extension, we allow for investment and
asset pledging by the relevant parties and show how managerial residual claimancy can be used to overcome
this tendency toward excessive monitoring in a rm with worker residual claimancy.
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c/q, and b/r to investors, the worker, and the manager, but then choosing to shirk on the
monitoring task. Comparing expected payo in each case, high eort is therefore preferred
when R ≥ Rm. The rm is ex ante feasible only when all parties are contractually promised
sucient incentive to choose high eort. The rm is therefore feasible under exactly the
same set of conditions that determine feasibility for a monitored rm that operates under
residual claimancy by the worker. It is straightforward and exactly analogous to verify
that the same holds true for residual claimancy by either the manager or passive investors.
Reassignment of residual claimancy inuences the distribution of surplus among the relevant
parties, but does not improve decision making with respect to project implementation.12
Cooperative Firm. In a cooperative rm, the worker performs the monitoring activity.
We continue to assume that passive investors fully nance the rm, and that the worker
is full residual claimant on rm value. If all parties are provided adequate incentive to
choose high eort, investors must again be oered at least I/p when the project succeeds.
Similarly, the manager must be oered at least b/r. In both cases, because the worker is
residual claimant it is optimal for her to pay no more than the minimum necessary.
The worker now has two tasks and can potentially choose to shirk on either or both of
them. When work and monitoring eort are both high, expected surplus for the worker
is p(R − I/p − b/r) −mc − c. If the worker continues to oer I/p and b/r to the investor
and manager, but chooses to shirk on just the working task, expected worker surplus is
r(R−I/p−b/r)−mc. Analogously, if the worker shirks on just the monitoring task, expected
worker surplus is q(R − I/p − b/r) − c, while if she shirks on both tasks expected surplus
is zero. To induce investor participation and managerial eort, R must be large enough to
ensure that the worker does not have an incentive to choose one of these deviation strategies.
Because only one deviation strategy can bind in equilibrium, we have
Lemma 3. (Feasibility Requirement with Worker Monitor) A cooperative rm is feasible if
and only if


















If the rst term is the largest of the terms in brackets, then provision of incentives for
work eort more than compensates for monitoring eort. In eect, the worker does not
need to be paid to monitor; she voluntarily incurs the monitoring cost mc based on her
private interest in seeing the project succeed. Although there is in some sense a saving from
not having to explicitly cover the monitoring cost mc, this scenario only arises when the
payment needed to motivate work eort, c/q, is suciently high. Similarly, when mc/r is
12Residual claimancy does potentially have eciency consequences with respect to action choices. In par-
ticular, when Assumption 1 is relaxed so that projects are feasible when eort on one of the tasks is low,
residual claimancy by an agent who takes an action will generally result in better action decisions than
residual claimancy by passive investors (who do not take an action beyond agreeing to invest). Endogenizing
the assignment of residual claimancy is beyond the scope of our analysis, but seems like a potentially fruitful
direction for future research.
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the largest term in brackets, then incentives for monitoring eort more than compensate
for work eort. When (mc + c)/p is the largest term, then the worker has the strongest
incentive to shirk on both tasks. However, because shirking on both tasks results in certain
project failure, the worker earns no information rents. Absent the informational rents paid
to the manager, there would be no credit rationing in this case.
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, we have
Proposition 1. (Market Extension with Worker Monitor) Relative to a rm with no mon-
itoring, worker monitoring extends the feasible range of market activity when mc ≤ ∆B or
c/q > max {mc/r, (mc + c)/p}.When mc > ∆B, it extends market activity if
• mc/r > max {c/q, (mc + c)/p} and mc < ∆B + rc/q; or
• (mc + c)/p > max {c/q,mc/r} and mc < p∆B/r + rc/q.
Proof. See Appendix. 
If mc < ∆B, then worker monitoring expands feasibility for exactly the same reason
private monitoring does: it reduces managerial information rents, thus increasing the
success-contingent surplus that can be pledged to the investor, without compromising
protability for the worker. However, even when mc > ∆B, worker monitoring can still
expand the feasible range of market activity. Intuitively, this is because worker monitoring
additionally saves on information rents paid to the monitor. More formally, assume the
worker monitors. Then to ensure that the worker has an incentive to exert high work
eort, the worker's success-contingent payment, after paying the passive investors and
manager, must be at least c/q. However, if c/q > max {mc/r, (mc + c)/p}, then this
quantity also guarantees that the worker is better o exerting high monitoring eort,
regardless of the relationship between mc and B. Similarly, when
mc/r > max {c/q, (mc + c)/p}, then the success contingent payment that is required to
induce high monitoring eort also induces high work eortthough mc cannot be too large
in this case; otherwise total agency rents paid in the worker monitored rm, (mc + b)/r,
are greater than rents paid in an unmonitored rm, B/r + c/q. Analogous logic can be
used to explain what happens when incentives are strongest to shirk on both tasks.
Summarizing, when R < Ru and mc ≤ ∆B, worker monitoring reduces total information
rents and transfers some of what the manager would earn absent monitoring to the worker.
When mc > ∆B, the worker eectively takes on higher-powered incentives but accepts a
lower net expected return[p(R− I/p− b/r)−mc − c] versus [p(R− I/p−B/r)− c] to
enable project feasibility.
The model in this section is a simple formalization of the cooperative rm, but one
that accords well with the dierences noted earlier regarding compensation policies for the
directors of private and cooperative rms. One explanation for the near complete lack of
performance-based pay of directors in cooperative organizations is that member directors do
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not need separate motivation to provide managerial oversight: they are indirectly motivated
by a belief that without such oversight they might face a reduction in pay, or worse, lose
their jobs. The next proposition, which is the main result of our analysis, demonstrates that
this eect can extend the market by more than private monitoring. In particular, Lemmas
2 and 3 yield:
Proposition 2. (Worker versus Private Monitoring) Relative to a rm with private moni-
toring, worker monitoring extends the feasible range of market activity if
• c/q > max {mc/r, (mc + c)/p}; or if
• mc/r > max {c/q, (mc + c)/p} and mc < mp + rc/q; or if
• (mc + c)/p > max {c/q,mc/r} and mc < pmp/r + rc/q.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 2 compares the implementation of the project from two rms that are distinct
from an internal organization viewpoint. Formally, this proposition reiterates the require-
ment that for worker monitoring to extend the market, mc must not be too largebut this
time in relation to the cost of private monitoring. The result emphasizes the source of advan-
tage for the cooperative rm in terms that directly relate to its observable formal structure,
namely the bundling of work and managerial control. As we pointed out in the introduction,
there is substantial evidence suggesting that the cooperative rm exists largely in low-return
economic environments. Proposition 2 provides one compelling reason why this may be so.
This proposition also facilitates determining the equilibrium organizational structure as a
function of the strength of the market, R. We do this in the next section.
Equilibrium Organization. Subject to nancial feasibility, the worker chooses the or-
ganizational structure that maximizes her ex ante expected payo. The worker earns an
expected payo U ≡ p(R − I/p− B/r)− c when there is no monitoring, U + pr (∆B −mp)
when she hires a private monitor, and U + pr ∆B −mc when she forms a cooperative. The
following proposition summarizes the worker's optimal organizational choice.
Proposition 3. (Equilibrium Organization) Assume mc < mp+rc/q. Then for all R < Rc,
no organization is feasible. Otherwise, we have the following two mutually exclusive regimes:
(i) if mp > ∆B or mc < pmp/r, then the worker never hires a private monitor and
• if mc ≤ p∆B/r, then the worker monitors in the equilibrium organization for
all R ≥ Rc;
• if instead mc > p∆B/r, the worker monitors in the equilibrium organization
for Rc ≤ R < Ru, while for R ≥ Ru there is no monitoring.
(ii) if mp ≤ ∆B and mc ≥ pmp/r, then for Rc ≤ R < Rm the worker monitors in the
equilibrium organization, while for R ≥ Rm the worker hires a private monitor.
Proof. See Appendix. 
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When mc < mp + rc/q, then Rc < Rm: worker monitoring extends the market further
beyond any extension provided by private monitoring. The relationship between mc and
pmp/r determines when worker monitoring is preferred to private monitoring, conditional
on nancial feasibility for both forms of organization. When mc ≤ pmp/r, information rents
paid by the worker to a private monitor are greater than the cost of worker monitoring. The
relationship between mp and ∆B determines when private monitoring expands the range of
economic activity, relative to no monitoring.
In the rst regime, either private monitoring cannot extend the market (mp > ∆B),
or the worker can always increase prot by replacing the private monitor and forming a
cooperative (mc < pmp/r). In this case, private monitoring can never emerge in equilibrium.
Moreover, if monitoring eectively transfers agency rent from the manager to the worker
(mc ≤ p∆B/r), then the worker monitors even when doing so is not necessary for rm
nancial viability (R ≥ Ru). Otherwise, if mc > p∆B/r, then the worker monitors only
when Rc ≤ R < Ru.
In the second regime, private monitoring can extend the market (mp ≤ ∆B), and is not
dominated by worker monitoring (mc > pmp/r). In this case, the worker only monitors for
R below Rm, and delegates monitoring to a third party for R > Rm. There is monitoring
even when it is not necessary for rm survival because doing so transfers surplus from the
manager to the worker (mp ≤ ∆B implies (mp + b)/r ≤ B/r).
This proposition clearly demonstrates the market extending role of worker monitoring.
Interpreting R as a measure of market strength, the cooperative rm (worker monitor-
ing) either is the only form of equilibrium monitoring and market extension (regime i), or
extends the market further beyond the extension provided by private monitoring (regime
ii). In regime ii, the cooperative is born out of necessity, but degenerates when market
conditions are strong. A rm that begins its life under worker monitoring because that is
the only way to secure nance, is apt to hire out the monitoring activity if market conditions
improve suciently. This logic is consistent with the cooperative life cycle hypothesis, and
more generally with observations regarding the role of cooperatives meeting unmet needs,
but tending to convert or demutualize when the rm achieves strong prot performance.
Worker monitoring generates a welfare gain relative to an environment without worker
monitoring if market conditions are weak, but results in excess monitoring when market
conditions are strong. For R > Ru the rm is feasible without monitoring, and thus capable
of generating expected surplus pR − I − c, but the manager is always monitored except
possibly when mc > p∆B/r. More formally,
Corollary 2. (Excessive Monitoring) If mc < p∆B/r, then equilibrium monitoring is ex-
cessive for R > Ru.
This is a sucient condition for excessive monitoring. Monitoring can still be excessive
even when mc ≥ p∆B/r provided that regime 2 in Proposition 3 is the relevant one. This
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result is not a consequence of worker monitoring per se, but rather of worker residual
claimancy. When the worker is residual claimant, and provided mc < p∆B/r, monitoring
eectively transfers rent (at a cost) from the manager to the worker. In a worker-monitored
rm, managers earn fewer rents than in a privately-monitored rm. Thus, even when doing
so is not necessary for nancial viability, monitoring is used to redistribute surplus in the
organization. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) study a model with equilibrium under
monitoring. Corollary 2 demonstrates that this results from the assumed managerial
residual claimancy in their model. When the manager, rather than the worker, sets wage
and nancial policy for the rm, she of course prefers less monitoring.
Although we are not aware of an empirical study that explicitly studies whether moni-
toring is excessive or not, anecdotal and case-study evidence exists suggesting higher rates
of managerial turnover (a potential indicator of dysfunctional board behavior) in coopera-
tive organizations. In a historical study of governance and incentive design in 19th century
Danish creamery cooperatives, Hviid (2006, pp. 51-52) documents relatively high rates of
managerial turnover relative to private creameries. Bellas (1972, pp. 53-54) documents a
similar phenomena in the plywood worker cooperatives of the U.S. Pacic Northwest. He
notes that, Several managers maintain their permanent residence hundreds of miles from
their job and then rent accommodations near the mill. A story is told of one manager who
brought only one personal item, his hat, to the oce; he kept it on the corner of his desk,
signifying that he was ready to leave when he wasn't wanted.
Extensions
We have so far assumed that the worker is residual claimant, even in a rm that is pri-
vately monitored. Moreover, we have not allowed any party other than the passive investors
to contribute wealth to the project. In this section, we relax these assumptions and demon-
strate that the core qualitative results presented so far remain unchanged. We also show
that the qualitative properties of Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold under a more exible
specication of the production technology relating worker and manager actions to the prob-
ability of success. Finally, we briey comment on the potential benecial role of ownership
illiquidity in cooperative rms, and consider the possibility of collusion between the monitor
and manager.
Intermediary Competition and Asset Pledging by Workers. Here we add two ex-
tensions to the model, relative to the previous section. First, we suppose that a private
monitor, in addition to the passive investors, can contribute capital to the project. Second,
we allow the worker in a cooperative rm to pledge assets that, after some loss in value, can
be transferred to passive investors in the event of project failure. It is not uncommon for
cooperative members to pledge substantial private assets to sustain cooperative operation.
It is much less common to observe such contributions by workers in a private rm. Although
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we do not model the reason for this asymmetry,13 we do consider how such a dierence would
aect the equilibrium occurrence of cooperative activity.
The purpose of these extensions is to add further predictive content to our model. In
particular, we demonstrate that intermediary competition tends to reduce the scope for
equilibrium cooperative activity. When the market for intermediated capital is competitive,
the monitor does not earn any information rents. This eectively reduces Rm, expanding
the feasible range of market activity for a private rm, and therefore reducing the scope for
cooperative activity. Similarly, we show how asset pledging by the worker in a cooperative
rmto the extent that such pledging can only take place in a cooperative rmexpands
the feasible range of economic activity for worker monitoring. Thus, markets in which
workers have valuable (and relatively transferable) assets to pledge can more easily support
cooperative activity.
To give these predictions more precise meaning, rst consider the organization of a private
rm, and suppose that the monitor can contribute an amount Im to the project. If she does,
then passive investors contribute the remainder, I − Im. Without monitoring, and without
asset pledging by the worker, a private rm is feasible for all R ≥ Ru. For R < Ru, the worker
(who we continue to assume is residual claimant, even in a private rm) can tap a competitive
market for monitored nance. As before, monitoring eort costs mp and is unobservable.
Thus, the private monitor must be paid at least mp/r to ensure that monitoring actually
occurs in equilibrium. However, because the market for monitored nance is competitive,
the worker can request a capital contribution Im such that the monitor's expected payo
pmp/r − mp − Im = qmp/r − Im is exactly zero. The monitor's equilibrium investment
is therefore qmp/r, and passive investors contribute I − qmp/r. To ensure that passive
investors participate, they must receive at least (I−qmp/r)/p in the case of project success.
Contingent on success, the worker receives the project return, R, less payment to the
private monitor, mp/r, less the net payment to passive investors, (I − qmp/r)/p. Direct
calculation yields an expected surplus to the worker of p(R − I/p − b/r) − mp − c when
contributing high eort on the work task. Under low work eort as a deviation strategy,
the worker earns r(R− I/p− b/r)− (mp − qmp/p). Computing the minimum R needed to
induce high work eort, and comparing this value with Rm, yields
Proposition 4. (Market Extension with Intermediary Competition) Competition in the
market for intermediated nance expands the scope for equilibrium market activity by a
privately monitored rm with the project feasible if and only




Now suppose that in a cooperative rm, the worker can pledge illiquid assets worth F
to him . Examples of such assets include, among other items, workers' homes in the case
13Modeling the perverse incentives that arise for the manager and passive investor to collude represents one
possible means of endogenizing this asymmetry.
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of the labor-managed rm, and farmland or agricultural machinery in the case of farmer
cooperatives. We assume the assets are not perfectly redeployable so that they are only worth
f ≤ F to the passive investors. Passive investors receive and amount z when the project
succeeds, and the assets worth f when the project fails.14 They are therefore willing to
contribute funds when z ≥ (I− (1−p)f)/p. Assume the worker monitors the manager, pays
the manager the minimum amount necessary to ensure high managerial eort, and likewise
pays the minimum amount necessary to ensure participation by the passive investors. Then
the worker's expected return is p(R − I/p − b/r) −mc − c + F , where F ≡ pF + (1 − p)f
is the expected value of the worker's asset, given that it is pledged toward project success.
Given these contractual commitments, the worker can shirk on the work task and receive an
expected return of r(p−I/p−b/r)−mc+r(F+(1−p)f/p). Alternatively, the worker can shirk
on the monitoring task and receive expected return, q(p−I/p−b/r)−c+q(F +(1−p)f/p).
Shirking on both tasks yields zero. Comparing payos under high eort and each deviation
strategy for the worker, we have
Proposition 5. (Market Extension with Asset Pledging by Worker) Asset pledging by the
worker expands the scope for equilibrium market activity by a cooperative rm with the project
feasible if and only if




Taken together, these two propositions suggest that, all else equal, there is greater scope
for equilibrium cooperative activity when there is a high degree of imperfect competition in
nancial markets, and when workers have high value, and highly redeployable, assets.
Technology. Here we demonstrate that the principal qualitative result in Propositions 1
and 2 continue to hold under a more exible technology that relates actions of the worker and
manager to the probability of success. More generally, let ∆pm < p and ∆pw < p represent
the reduction in the probability of success when just the manager or worker shirks. Similarly,
let ∆p where ∆pm + ∆pw ≤ ∆p < p, represent the reduction in probability of success when
both parties shirk. Previously we assumed that ∆p = p = ∆pm + ∆pw. Relaxing this
assumption, we can evaluate the impact of a strong complementarity between the eorts of
the manager and worker (∆p large relative to ∆pm+∆pw). We can also consider comparative
statics with regard to changes in the eort productivity of a single agent, say ∆pm, without
changing the eort productivity of the other agent.
It is simple to show that with this new technology, a privately monitored rm is feasible
if and only if










14More generally, we can let the passive investors seize some fraction of f (or interpreted dierently, to seize
f with some positive probability strictly less than one) in the case of failure. This generalization does not
change the qualitative nature of our results.
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while a worker monitored rm is feasible if and only if


















Given these observations, the extensions of Proposition 1 and 2 are immediate. A strong
complementarity between the work and managerial tasks imply that the worker has
relatively weak incentives to shirk simultaneously on both tasks. From the expressions
above, where ∆p enters only in the second inequality, this favors the cooperative structure
by potentially relaxing a binding incentive constraint. In particular, if
(c+mc)/∆p > max {c/∆pw,mc/∆pm}, then an increase in ∆p expands the range of
market environments where a cooperative can operate.
As noted earlier, it is perhaps reasonable to expect worker-monitors to have better in-
formation about managerial performance than private monitors.15 We can model this by
supposing there are dierent values for the term ∆pm across the two organizational struc-
tures. If ∆pm is relatively large for a cooperative rm, then cooperative members are better
able to control managerial agency, and this to some extent osets the organizational dead-
weight loss ∆m.
Managerial Residual Claimancy. Here we consider a private rm where the manager is
residual claimant, and compare this with a cooperative rm where there is no asset pledging
by the worker. We can think of the manager as a wealth-constrained entrepreneur seeking
nance for a discrete project that requires the input of a worker, in addition to external
nancing (some of which potentially comes tied with costly monitoring).
First consider the manager seeking nancing only from passive investors. In doing so, she
must oer a claim on rm value of at least c/q to the worker to ensure high work eort,
and must promise the investors at least I/p. As noted previously, Lemma 1 continues to
hold under managerial residual claimancy. The project is feasible if and only if R ≥ Ru.
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that the manager can extend the feasible range of
market activity to Rm by hiring a private monitor (and to R
′
m by asking the monitor to
contribute sucient investment funds to the project). Thus, in terms of the range of feasible
activity for a private rm, rms that operate under residual claimancy for the manager are
indistinguishable from those that operate under residual claimancy for the worker.
There is, however, an important behavioral dierence between the two kinds of rms. As
Corollary 2 makes clear, a cooperative rm tends to over monitor when R is high. This is
because monitoring redistributes surplus from the manager to the worker. In contrast, when
the manager is residual claimant on rm value, there is no gain from monitoring beyond
extending the range of operation for the rm. This is a source of eciency associated with
15Alternatively, we can think of worker-monitors as having access to given information at lower cost. This
is not inconsistent with mc > mp if a large part of mc are collective decision making costs associated with
democratic governance. Although we have not modeled these costs explicitly, they can be conveniently
represented in reduced form as a contribution to mc.
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managerial control. Thus, in addition to the pure deadweight cost arising from the dierence
in monitoring costs, ∆m, we have an endogenous or behavioral source of disadvantage
for the cooperative rm that occurs specically when market conditions are strong. The
following proposition summarizes the impact of this disadvantage in terms of the equilibrium
organizational structure as a function of R:
Proposition 6. (Managerial Residual Claimancy for Private Firm) Assume: i) pr ∆B− c <
mc < mp + rc/q; ii) only passive investors have wealth to contribute to the project; iii) a
cooperative rm operates under worker residual claimancy; and iv) a privately monitored
rm operates under managerial residual claimancy. Then for all R < Rc, no organization
is feasible. Otherwise, as R increases,
• if Rc ≤ R < Rm, a cooperative rm is the equilibrium organization;
• if Rm ≤ R < Ru, a privately monitored rm is the equilibrium organization;
• if Ru ≤ R < R∗ ≡ (I +mc + c)/p+ b/r+ c/q, there is no monitoring in equilibrium
and the rm operates under managerial residual claimancy;
• if R ≥ R∗ then the equilibrium organization is indeterminate. The worker prefers
worker residual claimancy, and the manager prefers managerial residual claimancy.
A rm that operates under managerial residual claimancy earns more expected sur-
plus than a rm that operates under worker residual claimancy when mc + pb/r >
rc/q.
Proof. See Appendix. 
For R < Rm only the cooperative rm is feasible. For R between Rm and Ru, the worker
earns greater information rent as a worker in a privately monitored rm than she would as
residual claimant on return from a worker-monitored rm. However, for R suciently high,
cooperative expected returns (assuming there's no competition for market share, or that the
private rm exits the market) exceed what can be earned as an employee. In this case, the
worker can threaten entry and potentially extract some surplus from the private rm, or
potentially enter into competition. Analysis of the outcome of such competition is beyond
the scope of this paper, but Proposition 6 points to a potentially interesting interaction. In
a setting where managerial information rents are relatively small in comparison to rents that
must be paid to workers, the cooperative rm may be competitive even when it monitors
excessively. Moreover, as we will see below, there is good reason to believe that worker
monitors are less prone to colluding with management.
Financial Illiquidity and Commitment. Consider the possibility of a liquidity shock in
a privately monitored rm: before project success or failure is realized, but after the private
monitor has exerted eort, a new investment opportunity arises requiring the monitor's
services and a cash investment. The private monitor wishes to cash out of the existing
project, using this cash for investment in the alternative project. Liquidity of this sort
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weakens incentives for monitoring, potentially even generating opportunities for strategic
exit, by allowing the monitor to disinvest prior to the realization of performance. On the
other hand, liquidity reduces the equilibrium cost of acquiring monitored capital by allowing
the monitor to deploy her funds in their highest value use. Aghion et al. (2004, pp. 346-347)
study this tradeo and show that it is optimal to prohibit exit when the monitor's payo
in the outside opportunity is suciently low. They show, however, that the possibility of
interim renegotiation will generally undermine any attempt to do so. The authors suggest
that this result provides some basis of support for regulatory interventions that make exit
costly. The cooperative rm structure is potentially another institutional response to the
demand for commitment. It is reasonable to expect worker-monitors to have fewer outside
opportunities than private monitors. Additionally, dening ownership in terms of use,
rather than investment stake, limits creation of liquidity in markets for ownership: users are
heterogeneous, and users must be geographically proximate to the rm, neither of which is an
attribute of capital.16 Although often viewed as a handicap, the lack of exit opportunities for
cooperative members can serve to mollify passive lenders who are concerned with ensuring
dedicated managerial oversight.
Collusion. We have ruled out the possibility of collusion between the monitor and the
manager. Although this assumption is a reasonable starting point and simplies the analysis,
there is potentially an incentive for the manager to suggest that the monitor be lax in
return for a side payment. We briey consider this possibility and show that in general
opportunities for collusion between the manager and monitor are more limited when the
worker is the monitor. For a recent analysis of collusion, but in the context of venture
capital contracting for start-up nance, see Dessi (2005).
The manager has no wealth and so cannot propose an up-front payment, but she may
be able to transfer some portion of B to the monitor.17 The question we then ask is: are
there opportunities to collude, and are those opportunities more or less constrained in a
cooperative rm? We will show that collusion is always feasible in a private rm, while it is
always infeasible in a cooperative rm so long as ∆m, ∆B, and q are all suciently small.
Thus, although the cooperative rm tends to monitor too much, worker monitors are less
apt to collude with management against the interests of passive investors.
16Cook and Chaddad (2004) describe eorts by some agricultural marketing cooperatives (so-called new-
generation cooperatives) to create liquidity by requiring an equity investment in proportion to use, and
establishing a market for these use rights. Results have been mixed. In no case has there been much
active trading in use rights, and a number of prominent new-generation marketing cooperatives have been
converted to some form of investor-owned rm (Holland and King, 2004).
17By assumption the manager does not have any wealth and so cannot make an ex ante payment. Neither
can she make an ex post payment in the case of project failure, unless it comes from B. Allowing for some
exogenous cost of transferring these private noncontractible managerial benets to the monitor complicates
the analysis without adding any additional insight.
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First consider the potential for collusion in a privately monitored rm.18 In equilibrium,
and absent collusion, the manager earns expected surplus of pb/r, and the monitor earns
pmp/r−mp. By deviating and not exerting high eort, the manager can earn qb/r+B. The
manager can propose a collusive agreement either before or after the monitor has incurred
the costmp. For simplicity we consider only an ex ante agreement. The manager approaches
the monitor ex ante and proposes an ex post share of the managerial private benets B.
Not surprisingly, a transfer can always be chosen such that both parties gain. To verify
this, it is sucient to show that there exists a transfer τ such that qb/r + B − τ ≥ pb/r,
and qmp/r + τ ≥ pmp/r − mp. The rst inequality says that the manager is better o
shirking and paying the transfer than foregoing the project with private benets. Similarly,
the second inequality guarantees that the monitor gains by accepting the transfer and not
monitoring. This pair of inequalities can be rewritten as 0 ≤ τ ≤ ∆B so that such a τ can
always be found.
Now consider the possibility of collusion between the worker-monitor in a cooperative rm
and the manager. Absent collusion, the manager again earns pb/r, and the worker-monitor
earns p(R − I/p − b/r) − mc − c. Using reasoning analogous to that used above, an ex
ante collusive agreement is potentially feasible if τ ≤ ∆B, and q(R − I/p− b/r)− c+ τ ≥
p(R− I/p− b/r)−mc − c, or when





Thus, if τ > ∆B, then a collusive agreement is potentially sustainable in a private rm
when it is not in a cooperative rm. However, this condition depends on R being suciently
large. The following proposition, which is easily veried by substituting Rm into the ex-
pression for τ , demonstrates that R need not be too large, so long as ∆m, ∆B, and q are
suciently small:
Proposition 7. (Collusion) Suppose ∆B < rc/q −∆m. Then whenever a privately mon-
itored rm is nancially viable with R ≥ Rm, a cooperative rm is immune to collusion
between the manager and worker-monitor.
The amount rc/q − ∆m is the reduction in expected surplus for the worker-monitor
associated with managerial shirking, evaluated at Rm. ∆B is the maximum amount that
can be transferred from the manager to the worker to induce collusion. For ∆B suciently
small, collusion is not possible in the cooperative rm. To avoid collusion in a private rm,
the worker and monitor each need to be given a relatively large claim on ex post surplus.
This reduces the amount available to pay passive lenders, and potentially further limits
project feasibility. Thus, the possibility of collusion in a privately-monitored potentially
increases the scope for equilibrium market activity by a cooperative rm.
18We assume throughout this section that a private rm operates under residual claimancy by the worker;
assuming otherwise does not qualitatively change the analysis.
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As was stressed in the introduction, there are reasons for believing that cooperative orga-
nizations are handicapped in their ability to raise capital. Some scholars have argued that
empirical evidence is not consistent with this prediction (Hansmann, 1996, p. 75). Propo-
sition 7 provides a simple explanation for cooperatives' ability to overcome their handicap:
they are able to obtain loans on reasonable terms because their internal structure represents
a collusion-proof device that reassures passive investors. Bundling the work and monitor-
ing tasks again generates interesting organizational properties with respect to obtaining the
capital necessary for operations.
Conclusion
We study an organizational environment where rm production requires three generic
tasks: working, managing, and, when returns are suciently low, potentially some form of
managerial monitoring. This environment provides a convenient way to distinguish between
cooperative rms and other forms of ownership. In a cooperative rm, the working and
monitoring tasks are carried out by a single individual (or class of individuals), whereas in
a private rm the monitoring task is performed by a specialist. Our model endogenizes
choice over this pair of organizational structures, and characterizes the nature of economic
environments that support one or the other structure as an equilibrium outcome.
Assuming that worker monitoring is costly relative to monitoring by a specialist, we show
that worker monitoring arises as an equilibrium outcome only when market conditions are
relatively weak. When market conditions are strong, workers prefer employment in a pri-
vately monitored rm, though for market conditions suciently strong, they can credibly
threaten entry and potentially extract some market surplus that would otherwise accrue
to private investors. The fundamental mechanism at play in our model is the incentive
complementarity that arises from bundling two work tasks in a single individual (or class of
individuals). This, combined with the existence of agency rents, implies that worker mon-
itoring, though it ultimately shrinks total economic surplus relative to private monitoring,
can increase the share of surplus which is promised to external investors. By doing so,
the cooperative rm opens up opportunities for equilibrium economic activity that would
otherwise not exist.
A cooperative rm tends to monitor too much. This, together with the relatively costly
nature of worker monitoring, tend to support privately monitored organizations as an equi-
librium outcome when market conditions are relatively strong. There is, however, a counter-
vailing eect to the extent that the potential for collusion between monitors and managers
aects equilibrium nancial contracts. A cooperative organization is less susceptible to
collusion.
Our results are broadly consistent with stylized evidence regarding the nature and inci-
dence of cooperative activity. In particular, it is often noted that cooperative rms tend
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to operate in relatively low-return settings that are unable to attract private capital. Sim-
ilarly, cooperative rms often degenerate when market conditions are strong. Our model
eectively provides a hard-times explanation for these phenomena: a cooperative arises
out of necessity as the only feasible means of attracting nance when returns are low, but
degenerates or converts when returns are high because doing so is Pareto ecient.
Additionally, our model can account for the stark dierence in pay practices of board
members across cooperative and private rms. Cooperative board members typically receive
per diem and travel expenses, while the members of private boards often receive substantial
performance-based pay. It is quite intuitive to imagine that these dierences are at least
partially attributable to the dierential incentive that workers and shareholders have to
monitor the rms they own. Shareholders in private rms tend on average to own a small
fraction of total rm equity, and moreover do not have any commercial relationship beyond
their investment that provides motivation for managerial oversight. Workers (or input sup-
pliers) on the other hand, are motivated both by a relatively high ownership stake, and by
the prospect of reduced future wages if the rm performs poorly.
There are a number of potential directions for future research. First, we have not con-
sidered competition between a private and cooperative rm. We noted that when market
returns are suciently high workers may be able to threaten entry, but we did not explicitly
model the relevant interaction. If entry results in the two rms splitting the market some-
how, there may be environments that support simultaneous existence of cooperative and
private enterprise. Worker monitors are less prone to collude with management. Moreover,
to the extent that the worker's actions are important relative to the actions of management,
there may be a benet from residual claimancy by workers. Both eects counteract the
costly nature of worker monitoring and create an opportunity for competitive interaction
between the two types of rms.
Second, we have not modeled control, which when allocated to workers represents an-
other important structural dierence between private and cooperative rms. Cooperative
incorporation statutes proscribe majority control by non-members and explicitly limit the
return that can be paid on outside equity. Presumably, restrictions such as these are in-
tended to encourage member investment that otherwise would not be forthcoming. Thus, a
formal model of interaction between nance, managerial oversight, and control is needed to
more fully describe the cooperative rm.
Lastly, our model provides some direction for empirical work on cooperative governance.
Most of the extant empirical research on cooperatives largely ignores or sidesteps rm gov-
ernance by assuming that what distinguishes the cooperative rm, relative to other forms
of business organization, is its objective function. This assumption eectively puts all
form of interaction between members, the rm's board, the rm's manager and employ-
ees, and external nanciers, in a black box that, while useful for some purposes, closes
o the possibility of studying governance directly. This is unfortunate because dierences
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in governance arguably are central to what distinguishes the cooperative business model.
Some questions that emerge from our analysis include: Controlling for rm size and other
markets characteristics, do cooperative rms pay less than private rms for director ser-
vices? Do cooperative boards monitor excessively (and how can this be measured)? How do
contracts between third-party lenders (such as banks) and cooperative rms dier relative
to similar contracts with private rms? Do cooperative rms compensate their manager's

























The proposition identies various conditions that are sucient for this inequality to hold.
There are three cases to consider depending on which term is the largest of c/q, mc/r, and
(mc + c)/p. First, suppose that c/q > max {mc/r, (mc + c)/p}. Then Ru−Rc = ∆B/r > 0.










which is greater than zero so long as mc < ∆B + rc/q. Third, suppose (mc + c)/p >







− mc + c
p
,
which is greater than zero so long as mc < p∆B/r+rc/q. Lastly, if mc ≤ ∆B, then because
rc/q > 0 and p/r > 1, we have Ru −Rc > 0 in all three cases. 
Proposition 2:
Proof. The proof proceeds analogously to the previous one, except that we wish to determine



















First, suppose that c/q > max {mc/r, (mc + c)/p}. Then Rm − Rc = mp/r > 0. Second,








which is greater than zero so long as mc < m + rc/q. Third, suppose (mc + c)/p >







− mc + c
p
,
which is greater than zero so long as mc ≤ pmp/r + rc/q. 
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Proposition 3:
Proof. Whenmc < mp+rc/q, then by Lemmas 1-3, Rc < min {Ru, Rm} and no organization
is feasible for R < Rc.
Let Up ≡ U + pr (∆B − mp) and Uc ≡ U +
p
r ∆B − mc represent the worker's expected
payo under private and cooperative monitoring. First suppose that mp > ∆B, or that
mc < pmp/r. Then either private monitoring is dominated by no monitoring because
Up < U , or by cooperative monitoring because Up < Uc. Moreover, under these conditions,
cooperative monitoring dominates no monitoring for all R if mc ≤ p∆B/r because then
Uc ≥ U . If instead, mc > p∆B/r, then Uc < U so that the worker monitors only when
doing so is necessary for nancial feasibility, or when Rc ≤ R < Ru.
Next, suppose mp ≤ ∆B and mc ≥ pmp/r. Then the worker (weakly) prefers private
monitoring to no monitoring and to cooperative monitoring because Up ≥ U and Up ≥ Uc.
However, for Rc ≤ R < Rm, only cooperative monitoring is nancial feasible. 
Proposition 6:
Proof. There are ve regions to consider.
(i) R < Rc: When mc < mp + rc/q, then by Lemmas 1-3, Rc < min {Ru, Rm}; no
organization is feasible in this region.
(ii) Rc ≤ R < Rm: By Lemmas 2 and 3, a privately monitored rm is not feasible for
R < Rm, and a worker-monitored rm is feasible only for R ≥ Rc; therefore, the
worker-monitored rm is the only feasible organization in this region.
(iii) Rm ≤ R < Ru: The manager can contract for services from a private monitor, and







) > 0, (1)
while the worker earns pc/q. Alternatively, the worker can propose a contract to
the manager and monitor the manager herself, or hire a private monitor. In this
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under private monitoring. We wish to show that both the manager and the worker
prefer managerial residual claimancy with private monitoring. Comparing expres-
sions (2) and (3), worker monitoring always dominates private monitoring for the
worker provided mc < pmp/r. Using the second inequality in part i) of the propo-
sition, and noting that p/r > 1, this is always the case. The manager prefers
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managerial residual claimancy combined with private monitoring whenever the ex-
pression in (1) is greater than pb/r. This is true for all R > Rm, and is therefore
always the case for the region under consideration. Similarly, the worker prefers
to be employed by the manager when pc/q exceeds the expression in (2). Direct
comparison yields
R <









We need to verify that R∗ > Ru, which holds whenever mc > p∆B/r − c. The
condition stated in the rst inequality of part i) from the proposition ensures this
inequality is always satised.
(iv) Ru ≤ R < R∗ : We have just veried that the worker prefers to be employed by
the manager (when this form of organization is feasible) for R < R∗. We wish to
show that the manger prefers not to monitor in this region. With monitoring, the
manager's expected payo is given by the expression in (1). From Lemma 1, the
rm is feasible without monitoring, and managerial prots increase by the amount
pmp/r.
(v) R > R∗: R∗ is dened to be the value of R such that, for all larger values, the
worker prefers to control the rm, than work for the manager. The expected payo
for the worker in this case is given by p(R−I/p−b/r)−c−mc, which is less than the
expression for the manager's expected payo without monitoring, p(R− I/p− c/q),
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